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Abstract

the same operations as normal personal computers (PC),
but they are more desirable as their small size means they
fit in a pocket [24]. The recent trend is for users to use
PDAs instead of a laptop. Thus there is a real need to
make PDAs more useful for electronic commerce applications.
We note that there were several previous works that attempted to connect PDAs to PCs to assist them to perform
some “heavy” computations, for example [6]. However,
due to the recent development of PDAs, for example the
new Intel XScale processor with 400 MHz, it is possible
for PDAs to perform such computations by themselves.
The problem with connecting PDAs to normal PCs is the
fact that the PCs are not trusted [6], and therefore, some
secure challenge-response protocols are required to enable the PDA to perform such computations. This will
of course generate some overheads, in terms of computations and communications generated by the protocols.
Moreover, due to their mobility, it is desirable for PDAs to
perform any computation by themselves without involving
any additional PC.
We only consider the Pocket PC environment (also
known as Windows CE) in this paper. However, an extension to another operating system such as Linux (used
in Yopi [28] and Sharp’s Zaurus [23]) is straightforward.
In this paper, we are interested in using PDAs with a
basic cryptographic calculation, i.e. the use of the squareand-multiply algorithm to find y from y = g x (mod p).
For a complete survey on Fast Exponentation algorithms,
we refer the reader to [11]. We are interested to know
whether there is any relation between the time (or the battery life) taken to perform the computation and the secret

Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) are the miniature of
normal size PCs, with a very limited computational power.
In this paper, we investigate the security of PDAs when
they are used to perform some cryptographic applications.
In our context, we investigate the computation y = g x
(mod p), for a prime p, which is believed to be secure in
the sense of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) assumption. To be more precise, knowing only p, g and y,
it is hard to derive x. We note that this computation is
the most important operation in most cryptographic algorithms. However, due to the limited computational power
of PDAs, such computation requires some amount of time
(and battery life). We show that by observing one of these
parameters, we can reduce the hard problem of DLP to be
predictable, and hence it is not secure. We also show how
to securely generate these kind of computations with PDAs
by employing some different techniques, so that they will
not reveal any additional information to a passive eavesdropper. In contrast to previous works, we do not assume
that the attacker can take the full control of the PDA. This
assumption is only applicable to a smart card whenever it
is used in a malicious smart card reader.
Keywords: Network Security, Mobile Computing, Personal Digital Assistant, Fast Exponentiation

1 Introduction
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) have become an
important part of our life. Currently, PDAs can perform
1

value (namely x), which is x = logg (y). The result is surprisingly predictable and it shows that using the squareand-multiply algorithm on a PDA is not secure. This basic
cryptographic computation is the most important operation required in most cryptographic algorithms (for example, Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [9], ElGamal
encryption algorithm [10], etc.).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we briefly describe some related background
information on PDAs and the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) related to our purpose. In section 3, we show
the results of our experiment and point out the insecurity
of the square-and-multiply operation in a PDA. In section
4, we discuss several other techniques that could be used
to achieve secure computation on a PDA. Section 5 concludes the paper. In the Appendix, we list the results of
our experiment.

dows CE (or Pocket PC) APIs are modeled after those of
Windows NT, but internally Windows CE is a new code
base. The Pocket PC operating system is the operating
system that is used in a Pocket PC PDA. The current
release is Pocket PC 2002, named after its predecessor,
Pocket PC 2000 (also known as Pocket PC 3).
There are four main types of Pocket PC hardware,
namely Palm-size Pocket PC (Ps/PC), Pocket-size Pocket
PC (P/PC), Handheld PC (H/PC) and CEPC (a standard
desktop PC running Windows CE). Starting from Pocketsize Pocket PC version 1.1 (equipped with Windows CE
2.11), a standard Windows CE device supports the ADO,
MFC, ATL and eVB code [19]. The standard processor
used in the current Pocket PC device is a Strong ARM
which runs at 206 MHz. The latest processor is an Intel
XScale processor which runs at 400 MHz, but unfortunately the current Pocket PC 2002 operating system has
not been optimized to use this ability.
A Pocket PC device can be synchronized with a desktop PC through synchronization software called “ActiveSync”. The synchronization can be done through either a serial port, a USB port, an infrared port, a Bluetooth
“virtual” port or a network (Ethernet connection) and Remote Access Service (RAS) server. ActiveSync serves
four major purposes: data synchronization, file management, file backup and software installation.

1.1 Notations
The ring of integers modulo an integer p is denoted by
Zp , and its multiplicative group, which contains only the
integers relatively prime to p, by Zp∗ . |x|2 denotes the size
of x in its binary representation. ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest
integer that is ≤ x.

1.2 Our Contributions
2.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) Assumptions and the Square-and-Multiply Algorithm

In this paper, we show that applying the square-andmultiply algorithm to compute g x (mod p) will reveal
some information to a passive attacker who can measure
the time taken to perform such computation. We also show
that battery consumption could reveal similar information.
We argue that this measurement can be done efficiently
when the device uses wireless connections, such as Bluetooth or Wireless LAN, and the connection has not been
properly configured. We also show a way to securely compute this value on a PDA by using techniques other than
square-and-multiply.

One of the most important cryptographic assumptions
used in the construction of several cryptosystems is the
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) Assumption, which is
defined as follows [25].
Problem Instance. I = (p, α, β), where p is prime, α ∈
Zp is a primitive element and β ∈ Zp∗ .
Objective. Find the unique integer a, 0 ≤ a ≤ p − 2, such
that αa ≡ β (mod p). In other words, a ≡ logα (β).
It is well-known that this problem is considered to
be intractable [25]. The DLP assumption has been used
to create several cryptosystems, including the ElGamal
[10] cryptosystem. This intractability assumption has also
been used to create signature schemes, such as fail-stop
signatures [27] and undeniable signatures [7]. It is also
used to create a server-aided computation [3], such as the
one proposed in [6]. Maurer and Wolf [17] proved that
the Diffie-Hellman problem and the DLP are polynomialQ
time equivalent in a cyclic group G of order |G| = pei i ,
where all the multiple prime factors of |G| are polynomial
in log|G|.

2 Related Information and Background
In this section, we briefly give an overview of a PDA,
and in particular a Pocket PC device. We also describe the
primitive cryptographic calculation that we are interested
in exploring, together with some previous works.

2.1 Pocket PC PDA
Pocket PC is a new operating system, which is not a
port from Windows NT or Windows 9x [19]. The Win2

It is predicted in [16] that the size of the Discrete Logarithm field that is used in DLP must be at least 1881 bits,
to make it secure until the year 2020. It is also noted that
the size of subgroup DLP must be at least 151 bits to make
it secure for the same duration.
The common way to compute y = g x (mod p) is by
using a technique that is known as “square-and-multiply”
[25]. This method reduces the number of modular multiplications required to compute g x (mod p) to at most
2ℓ, where ℓ = |x|2 . The method is illustrated as follows.

showed that an attacker may be able to find fixed DiffieHellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other
cryptosystems, by only observing the amount of time required to perform private key operations [15]. In general,
this is known as the “side-channel attack”. Although the
result presented in his paper is quite theoretical, Kocher
gave the basic idea that it is possible to exploit some secret elements of the system by measuring time taken. The
main problem with his approach is the fact that the attacker must have a very good knowledge of the implementation of the system he is attacking. The first practical
attack was described at the rump session of Crypto ’97 by
Lenoir. Another practical implementation of a timing attack was described in [8], which was proposed with the
implementation on a smart card. The error correction that
could be used to improve the result of [8] was proposed in
[12].
In [15], Kocher mentioned several countermeasures to
prevent timing attacks. The straightforward solution is to
make all operations take exactly the same amount of time.
However, this method is not practical. A better solution
is to use a blinding method [8]. Joye proposed several
techniques to prevent timing attacks [13] in a smart card.
Kocher et al. introduced another kind of attack, known
as power analysis attack [21, 22]. Power analysis attacks
work by measuring the power consumption of a tamperresistant device when it performs the cryptographic operations. Power analysis attacks fall into two basic categories. One is Simple Power Analysis (SPA), and the
other is Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
We note that most of the work was introduced mainly
to examine the security of symmetric key cryptographic
algorithms. For example, the analysis of the Digital Encryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [20] were described in [22] and [5], respectively. The work on the power analysis attack on the
public key algorithm was introduced in [26]. More specifically, Messerges et.al. [26] tried to attack the modular exponentiation in a smart card. This is closely related to our
work, however [26] assumed that the attacker has the full
control over the smart card when it is used. The attacker
owns the malicious smart card reader to enable his malicious side channel attack when the smart card is used in
the reader. We cannot make this assumption in this work
since the PDA does not need to be connected to any other
peripheral when it performs the cryptographic algorithm.
We would also like to highlight that the work on smart
cards is completely different to the one that we are investigating. A PDA (or a handheld device, in a more general term) has more computational power compared to a
smart card [4], and therefore, it is desirable to allow a PDA

Algorithm 2.1: S QUARE A ND M ULTIPLY (g, x, p)
comment: Compute g x

(mod p)

z←1
for i ← ℓ − 1 downto 0
do

2
z ← z (mod p)
?
if x = 1
 i
then z ← z ∗ g (mod p)

In the above algorithm, the exponent x is represented in
binary notation as follows
x=

ℓ
X

xi 2i

i=1

where xi = 0 or 1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1.
We note that in Algorithm 2.1, the number of squarings
is |x|2 . The number of modular multiplications is equal to
the number of 1s in the binary representation of x. This algorithm is well-known and is the most common algorithm
used to compute g x (mod p). For the complete history
of this algorithm, we refer the reader to [14].
It is noted in [8] that the time required for the multiplication part of the algorithm is constant, independent of the
factors, except that if the intermediary result of the multiplication is greater than the modulus, then an additional
reduction has to be performed at the end of the multiplication. That means that for some factors, the multiplication
time will be longer than for others. Knuth [14] gives a
right-to-left version of the algorithm, which has the advantage of not needing to know ℓ ahead of time. Several
other methods could be used to compute the above operation. For a complete survey, we refer the reader to [11]
.

2.3 Related Works: Side-Channel Attacks
An important related work is the concept introduced by
Kocher which is known as the “Timing Attack” [15]. He
3

Based on our observations, we conclude that the following equation applies

to perform some cryptographic computations without the
need of an untrusted/trusted PC.

(s + m − 1) ∗ 1000 ≈ T

3 Experiments with Square-and-Multiply
Algorithm in PDAs

To be more precise, we obtain
1
t = ⌊s + m − ⌋
2

In this section, we describe our test bed experiment
to compute g x (mod p) in a PDA. For the first experiment, we are interested in the time taken to complete such
a computation on a PDA. We investigate the relation between the time taken to perform such a computation, since
a PDA has a very limited computational power, and the
secret exponent x. The result is surprising since we can
estimate the secret exponent x that is used in the computation by only observing the time taken to perform the
computation. We note that this result is not applicable
when the computation is performed in a PC. We also extend our experiment to measure the battery life of a PDA,
which also produces some similar results. The details of
the experiment and the result are illustrated in Figure 2.
The complete result of our experiment will appear in the
final version of this paper.

(1)

Hence, by observing the time required to perform the
computation, we can estimate the number of squarings
and multiplications that have been performed.
We note that s = |x|2 . We also observe that m ≤ s.
Applying this knowledge to equation (1), we can find the
number of possible x that satisfy equation (1) (denoted by
δ) by only observing t as follows.
⌊t+ 12 ⌋

δ=

X

s=⌊ 2t +1⌋



s−1
m−1



(2)

Applying the knowledge from (1), we obtain
⌊t+ 12 ⌋

X

δ=

3.1 Experiment Settings

s=⌊ 2t +1⌋



s−1
⌊t + 12 ⌋ − s



(3)

Theorem 3.1 Given the time t (in seconds) taken to compute g x (mod p) in a PDA, there are δ possible solutions to x, where

We conducted an experiment with an iPaq Pocket PC
H3630, which has a Strong Arm processor running at 206
MHz. The program, written in Embedded Visual C++,
computes y = g x (mod p) and records the time taken to
perform this computation. The computation is done using
the square-and-multiply method given in Algorithm 2.1.

⌊t+ 12 ⌋

δ=

X

s=⌊ 2t +1⌋

3.2 Experiment Results



s−1
⌊t + 12 ⌋ − s



Proof: We know that m ≤ s, and s = |x|2 . We require
that ⌊s + m − 12 ⌋ = t. From this equation, we obtain that
m = ⌊t + 12 ⌋ − s + 1. We know that for every single s,

s−1
there will be m−1
possible numbers. Since the number
of possible s’s range from ⌊ 2t + 1⌋ to ⌊t + 12 ⌋, then there
are δ possible solutions, where

As a result of the experiment, we captured the time
elapsed for every possible x in Zq . We include some
results of the experiment in the Appendix for completeness. In the experiment, we found an interesting relation
between the time elapsed and the number of squarings and
multiplications that were performed. To make our explanation clearer, some sample data and results are listed in
Figure 2 (Note: s is the total number of squarings, and m
is the total number of multiplications).

⌊t+ 12 ⌋

δ=

X

s=⌊ 2t +1⌋



s−1
m−1



Incorporating the previous knowledge about m, then the
equations are satisfied.
2

From now on, let s denote the number of squarings (the
third column in the table above), let m denote the number of multiplications (the fourth column), let t denote the
time in seconds and let T denote the time in milliseconds
T
).
(t = 1000

Theorem 3.2 Computing y = g x (mod p) in a PDA by
using the square-and-multiply algorithm is not secure.
4

Proof: If we can observe the time taken to perform this
computation, say t, then by using theorem 3.1, we can
find δ possible solutions to the equation. We note that
by knowing p, g and y, together with the knowledge of
δ possible solutions, one can find the unique x that has
been used in the computation. This contradicts the DLP
assumption and hence this computation is not secure. 2

PDA

Serial Connection

Figure 1. Connection to a PC with a serial connection

We note that this protocol is not applicable in practice.
Normally, a PDA is carried everywhere the owner goes.
With this condition, the protocol requires the PC partner
of the PDA to be carried also, which is impractical.
We also note that if the PDA has set up a partnership
with a PC (via the ActiveSync partnership, for example),
then it is possible to share a long-term secret key on both
sides. With this additional long-term secret key, the secret value x can be encrypted by the long-term secret key
before it is sent to the PC, and the result should also be
encrypted using the same key. This solution is better than
the previous one, but the security of the scheme depends
on the symmetric key algorithm that is used at both ends.
Although a slight modification using a challenge-response
protocol to obtain a fresh key is possible, it does not add
much security.
As mentioned earlier, this method requires a trusted
PC. With some modification, we can remove the need of a
trusted PC and replace it with an untrusted PC. However,
since the PDA can perform the operation by itself (c.f. a
smart card), we try to find an alternative method which
does not require a connection to a PC.

3.3 Extensions
We also conducted similar experiments by observing
the battery consumption that was used to perform the
computation y = g x (mod p) and the result is similar. We note that in practice, observing the battery life
or the time can be done quite easily, especially if the PDA
is connected to either an Intranet/Internet (via a Wireless
LAN 802.11, for example) or a Personal Area Network
(for example by using Bluetooth). This condition makes
the computation vulnerable against a passive attacker who
only listens to the communication.

4 An Alternative Way to Perform A Secure
Computation on PDAs
We have shown that the use of an efficient square-andmultiply algorithm to compute y = g x (mod p) is insecure. In this section, we discuss several alternatives that
could be used to perform such a computation on a PDA
which would not reveal any additional information to the
attacker. We start our discussion with a trivial scheme
which includes a trusted PC. Then we extend our work
to remove the need of a PC (either trusted or untrusted)
and allow the PDA to perform such computation by itself.

4.2 A Simple and Secure Scheme on a PDA: The
First Scheme
In this section, we propose a technique that could be
used to compute the above cryptographic operation. This
technique is inspired by [1], together with the basic technique known as the left-to-right 4-ary exponentiation [18].
The idea of the method that we use in this section is as
follows. To compute g x (mod p), we only need to know
g i (mod p), where i = 0, 1, · · · , 15. The method works
as follows. Firstly, we convert x to its binary representation. Then we process each byte (4 bits) starting from its
most significant byte. For each iteration, we use knowledge of g i (mod p) to find the number represented by
each byte of x. Then we re-run the iteration until we have
the final result.
Using the above idea, our first scheme is described as
follows.

4.1 Client-Server Model with a Trusted PC
The first solution that could be employed is by using a
PC as a partner for a PDA. It means that the PC should
conduct the computation and send the result to the PDA.
This solution is somewhat trivial because the PC must be
trusted with the knowledge of the secret key x. The simplest protocol is as follows.
PDA → PC:
x, g, p
PC computes y = g x (mod p)
PC → PDA:
y
We note that the above protocol is subject to a man-inthe-middle attack. However, if the communication is performed by using a secure link, for example by using a
USB/serial cable or a PDA cradle (as illustrated in Figure
1), then the attack is not applicable.

1. PDA computes yi = g i
1, 2, 3, · · · , 15.
5

(mod p), where i =

x

x in Binary

s

m

7
9
10

111
1001
1010
1100

3
4
4
4

3
2
2
2

5090
4998
5063
5088

10000

5

1

5066

12
16

4.3 The Second Scheme

Time (in msec)

The technique that we use in this section is inspired
by [2]. We note that this technique is similar to the idea
of addition-subtraction chains described in [11]. We note
that in practice, we will not use a subtraction chain (which
means division) if the operation cannot be performed efficiently. However, in an operation on elliptic curves, the
division is easy and therefore including the subtraction
chain will not significantly increase the computation cost.

Figure 2. Result of Our Experiment
2. PDA computes y = g x
knowledge as follows.

(mod p) using the above

1. PDA
selects
n
random
R = {r1 , r2 , · · · , rn ∈ Z}, where
X
ri = x (mod q)

(a) PDA converts x to its binary representation.
(b) PDA uses the knowledge it gains from step 1 to
do the following steps.

numbers,

i∈n

2. PDA computes

i. Let i be the most significant byte of x (4
bits only). We note that g i (mod p) is
obtained from the look-up table that is generated by PDA. Let result = 1.
ii. If there are any bytes of x that have not
been processed, then do the following.
A. result = result16 (mod p).
B. result = result · g i (mod p).
C. i ← the next byte (4 bits) of x.
D. Goto (ii)
iii. Return result.

y i = g ri

(mod p)

3. PDA computes
y=

Y

yi

(mod p)

i∈n

to reveal y.
Lemma 4.1 The above interaction is sound.
P
Proof (sketch): Because i∈n ri = x (mod q), and
yi = g ri (mod p), then
Y
y =
yi (mod p)

We note that in the first step, the timing attack as we described earlier is still applicable. However, in the second
step, the passive eavesdropper cannot launch the timing
attack against the above computation.

i∈n

=
=

Y

i∈n
x

g

g xi

(mod p)

(mod p)
2

Example 4.1 Consider the following toy example. Suppose the PDA wants to compute g 220 (mod p). We note
that 220 in binary is 11011100. Firstly, the PDA will obtain the knowledge of g i (mod p) where i = 1, · · · , 15.
Knowing that the first byte of 220 is 1101 (which is 13 in
decimal), the PDA obtains g 13 (mod p) from its look-up
table. Next, the PDA obtains the least significant bytes of
220 (i.e. 1100 or 12 in decimal), and looks up the value
of g 12 (mod p). Finally, PDA “combines” the results
by multiplying g 12 (mod p) and g 208 (mod p) to obtain g 220 (mod p). This operation can be done securely
without any possible timing attack as we described earlier.

Example 4.2 Consider a toy example, where the PDA
would like to compute g 30 (mod p). The protocol is illustrated as follows.
1. PDA selects 5 numbers: {2, 3, 5, 7, 11}.
2. PDA computes yi = g xi (mod p), where x =
{2, 3, 5, 7, 11} and gain the knowledge {yi }.
3. PDA has the knowledge of g 2 (mod p), g 3
(mod p), g 5 (mod p), g 7 (mod p) and g 11
(mod p). Then, PDA computes
y˜1
y˜2

Corollary 4.1 A passive eavesdropper cannot learn the
secret, x, used by the PDA by observing the time/battery
that has been consumed.

ỹ
6

= g 2 · g 3 · g 7 (mod p)
= g 5 · g 5 · g −1 (mod p)
= y˜1 · y˜2 · y˜2

(mod p)

4. PDA has successfully computed g 30

(mod p).
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In the above example, a passive attacker could find out
that there were three multiplications performed in the last
step for each yi . However, it is not possible for him to
discover the exponent that was used in the above computation.
Theorem 4.1 Using the above protocol, the timing attack
proposed in the earlier section will not be effective.
Proof (sketch): The timing attack proposed earlier is only
effective when square-and-multiply is used. In the above
protocol, the PDA does not use this method to compute
the final result, and therefore the attack will not work. 2

5 Conclusions
We have described the result of an experiment which
shows the insecurity of a PDA to conduct some computation like g x (mod p). We showed that by only observing
the time required to perform such computation (or the battery life), we could derive the secret value that was used in
the computation. We do not assume that the attacker has
the full control over the PDA (c.f. [26]). We suggested
several other methods to perform such a computation securely on a PDA. Our methods do not require any help
from a normal PC.
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